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Executive Summary
A prerequisite for effective international action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in small
arms and light weapons (SALW) is that states develop a common understanding of what
constitutes the “legal” trade and therefore what is “illicit”. At the same time, failure to exert
e ffective control over the legal trade in SALW opens up possibilities for diversion to illicit markets
and end-users and blurs the lines between the legal and illicit trade. All governments are
potential suppliers of SALW, since even those with no manufacturing capacity will have the
potential to export surplus weapons once owned by their police and/or armed forces. A major
concern for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects should thus be to define clear parameters for and to agree on a comprehensive
mechanism for controlling the legal trade in these weapons.
There is extensive evidence that many of the weapons circulating in the illicit market originate
as state-sanctioned, or legally transferred, weapons. An essential element of efforts to combat
illicit trafficking must therefore be control of the legal trade to prevent diversion to unauthorised
end-users. At the same time, some governments have restrictively defined the illicit trade as
those international transactions which are not authorised by either one or both states concerned
in the transfers. Whilst such transfers are clearly illicit, a wider, global definition of the illicit
trade in SALW has, in fact, been articulated by the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
whose definition of the illicit trade is “that international trade in conventional arms, which is
contrary to the laws of States and/or international law”.
There is thus a clear need to take an holistic view of what constitutes the illicit trade in SALW,
and by so doing initiate a more comprehensive approach to combating the proliferation and
misuse of these weapons.
International law specifies a number of direct prohibitions on transfers of arms. These can take
the form of UN arms embargoes and trade sanctions, which impose a ban on the export of
some or all categories of arms to particular end-users, or controls on specific types of weapons
whose effects are deemed inhumane or excessively injurious. International law also curtails
s t a t e s ’ freedom to authorise transfers with restrictions primarily dependent upon the use being
made of the weapons. Accordingly, states should not transfer arms which they know could 
be used to violate the following principles: the prohibition on the threat or use of force; 
non-intervention in internal affairs of other states; preventing terrorism; international humanitarian
law; human rights law and standards; and preventing genocide. 
Beyond these restrictions, there are a number of other factors that governments, to a greater
or lesser extent, take into account when deciding whether or not to grant or refuse an export
licence for SALW. These concerns include the following: the threat of use of SALW in conflict;
the potential effect on international/regional stability; the undermining of economic development;
and the risk of diversion or transhipment to an illicit end-user.
If states actively develop and implement effective legislation and mechanisms for
implementing UN and regional arms embargoes, such action will go a considerable way to
preventing the proliferation and misuse of SALW. However, to be effective, UN arms
embargoes also need to be grounded in a framework of national, regional and internationally
agreed export criteria that provide for strict control and limitation of arms transfers that might
be diverted to embargoed destinations.
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3Executive Summary
The development of regional declarations has gathered pace as governments, sub-regional and
regional organisations have developed initiatives to bring to the 2001 Conference. The assertion
of the inextricable link between the illicit and legal trade in SALW has been made by the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the European Union (EU). Development of regionally accepted norms and
standards on legal transfers should pave the way towards the articulation of internationally
agreed norms and standards at the UN Conference.
The Preparatory Committee Draft Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/PC/L.4) 
of January 2001 articulates a range of measures that are necessary at national, regional and
global level in order to prevent and reduce “the diversion of the legal manufacture and transfer
[of SALW] to illicit channels” and with a view to fostering “responsible behaviour with regard
to the transfer of SALW and thereby reduc[ing] the opportunities to engage in the illicit trade
in SALW”.
The principles and measures set out represent minimum standards but nevertheless provide
a solid foundation for the establishment of effective international controls on the legal trade 
in SALW. At the same time, the UN Conference should agree upon a comprehensive set of
legal, administrative and practical measures including agreement on effective end-use controls
and provisions for information exchange on transfers of SALW to ensure that the elaborated
norms and standards are enforced rigorously by all states.
The UN Conference should also agree provisions for follow-up in these areas including an annual
review of the application of the norms and standards based on the provision of comprehensive
information on transfers of SALW on the part of all states. The progressive development of the
elaborated international norms and standards should be included in a formal review of the
implementation of the UN Conference Programme of Action; this review Conference should
moreover explore the development of a legally binding international agreement on the regulation
of SALW transfers.
Despite the development of national and regional arrangements which elaborate on the
necessity for controlling legal transfers of SALW, the illicit trade and misuse of these
weapons has continued. Only through the establishment of a detailed and comprehensive
set of internationally agreed norms and standards governing the legal trade in SALW,
coupled with the full implementation of national controls on legal transfers, will eff e c t i v e
progress in tackling the illicit trade in SALW be achieved.
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4Introduction: Scope and Context
A prerequisite for effective international action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in small
arms and light weapons (SALW)1 is that states develop a common understanding of what
constitutes the “legal” trade and therefore what is “illicit”. At the same time, failure to exert
effective control over the legal trade in SALW opens up possibilities for diversion to illicit
markets and end-users and blurs the lines between the legal and illicit trade. A major concern
for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
thus should be to define clear parameters, and to agree on a comprehensive mechanism for
controlling the legal trade in these weapons.
All governments are potential suppliers of SALW, since even those with no manufacturing
capacity will have the potential to export surplus weapons once owned by their police and/or
armed forces. The nature of the export, import, in-transit licensing and end-use certification
requirements imposed by governments, and the rigour with which they are monitored and
enforced, are therefore of great international importance since they can have a significant
role to play in ensuring that legitimate transfers of SALW are not diverted to illicit markets or
end-users.
The purpose this briefing is, however, to examine the external factors that governments take
into account during the SALW licensing process and, in particular, to assess how
governments can better control the “legal” trade in SALW so as to limit possibilities for the
illicit trade in, and use of, these weapons. Ultimately the objective is, in the context of the UN
Conference, to explore possibilities for developing a set of universal norms or principles that
could be applied to government-authorised transfers of SALW.
5Relevance Of Legal Controls on SALW Transfers
The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects is an historic opportunity for the international community to agree global action 
to prevent and reduce the spread and misuse of these weapons.
If the conference is to fulfil its potential, it is vital that it thoroughly address all aspects of illicit
S A LW trafficking. One aspect of the trade in SALW that is clearly illicit concerns those transfers
that are not authorised by all states in the chain, including importing, exporting and transit states.
H o w e v e r, there is pressure from a number of countries to define illicit trafficking narrowly –
making the conference applicable only to non-state sanctioned transfers and not to the control
of the state-sanctioned trade in SALW.
There is extensive evidence that many of the weapons circulating in the illicit market originate
as state-sanctioned, or legally transferred weapons. Case studies show that legal transfers
can be diverted to illicit destinations, as similarly, firearms licensed to civilians are stolen and
enter the black market.
For example, in June 1998, the UN Security Council passed a resolution prohibiting the sale
of arms and related material to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone. Despite this arms
embargo, there is strong evidence to suggest that arms continued to reach the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), who subsequently used them to carry out widespread and brutal 
human rights violations on the civilian population in Sierra Leone. The UN Secretary General,
as requested by Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), appointed a panel of experts 
to investigate allegations of violations of the embargo and the role of the trade in diamonds
from rebel-held areas. In December 2000 the UN Panel of Exports released its report.2
Contained in the report is a detailed analysis of how 68 tons of weapons from the Ukraine
reportedly found their way to Liberia. It is an illuminating case study illustrating how arms,
which originate in the legal market, make their way into the illegal market.
Another UN Panel – the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms – outlined the
interconnection between the legal and illicit trade in small arms in its 1999 report:3
“Illicit arms supply networks often involve legal arms purchases or transfers which are
subsequently diverted to unauthorized recipients, or leakage from arms storage facilities.
Arms brokers play a key role in such networks, along with disreputable transportation 
and finance companies. Illicit arms trafficking can sometimes be helped by negligent or
corrupt governmental officials and by inadequate border and customs controls. Smuggling of
illicit arms by criminals, drug traffickers, terrorists, mercenaries or insurgent groups is also 
an important factor. Efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking are in some cases hampered by
inadequate national systems to control stocks and transfers of arms, shortcomings or diff e r e n c e s
in the legislation and enforcement mechanisms between the States involved, and a lack of
information exchange and cooperation at the national, regional and international levels.”
A shipment of 68 tons of weapons, including SALW, arrived at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 
on 13 March 1999. The weapons were part of a contract between a Gibraltar-based company
representing the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso, and the Ukrainian state-owned company
Ukrspetsexport. A Ukrainian licence for sale of the weaponry was granted after Ukrspetsexport
had received an end-user certificate from the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso. The end-user
certificate authorised the Gibraltar-based company to purchase the weapons for sole use of the
Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso. The document also certified that Burkina Faso would be the
final destination of the cargo and the end-user of the weaponry. The weapons, however, were not
retained in Burkina Faso. They were temporarily off-loaded in Ouagadougou and some were
trucked to Bobo Dioulasso, also in Burkino Faso, where they were then trans-shipped.
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6Relevance Of Legal Controls on SALW Transfers
As an essential element in combating illicit trafficking therefore, governments must stringently
control the “state sanctioned” or “legal” trade. To be effective, a number of interlocking
controls on the legal trade are required, for example: import/export controls, end-use
certification systems, post delivery authorisation and controls on the activities of arms
brokering and shipping agents.
But as well as combating the risk of diversion, there is a second reason why controlling legal
transfers is fundamental to combating the illicit trade in SALW. Of those arms transfers of concern,
many are used illicitly in breach of international law. However, some governments have
restrictively defined the illicit trade as those international transactions that are not authorised
by either one or both states concerned in the transfers. Whilst such transfers are clearly illicit,
the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) has in fact, articulated a wider, global definition 
of the illicit trade in SALW. The Disarmament Commission Guidelines on Conventional Arms
Tr a n s f e r s4 have defined illicit trafficking as “that international trade in conventional arms,
which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law”. Years of research by
non-governmental organisations have shown that some SALW legally exported by states
have ultimately been used to violate international law, through their use in human rights
violations and breaches of international humanitarian law, by fuelling conflict and violent
crime, and undermining development and regional stability. Some state-authorised transfers
have directly contributed to such violations; others have been re-exported or diverted to
unauthorised end-users who have used them for such purposes.
There is therefore a clear need to take an holistic view of what constitutes the illicit trade in SALW,
and by so doing initiate a more comprehensive approach to combating the proliferation and
misuse of SALW. This analysis will then allow the international community to uncover tools 
to combat the illicit market more eff e c t i v e l y, by utilising mechanisms required for more rigorous
control of the legal trade.
Towards 
a definition 
of illicit
Background to Controls on Government-Authorised
Transfers of SALW
The UN Charter states that all governments have the right to self-defence. As a direct
consequence, most governments claim that they have a commensurate right both to acquire
the means of self-defence and to transfer them to other states. Indeed the primary rationale
(if not motivation) for the international trade in SALW is the right of states to acquire the means
of self-defence. Whilst it is incumbent upon states to ensure that they only acquire arms in
accordance with their legitimate internal and external security needs and their commitments
in the context of international peacekeeping missions,5 d i fficulties in arriving at a common
definition of a state’s legitimate security requirements have led governments to use significant
discretion in the application of this principle.
Nevertheless, a free market in SALW is far from existing. In general, governments do not allow
the transfer of arms to all prospective recipients, since not all potential recipients are regarded
as legitimate or desirable end-users. Indeed, unregulated arms trading could lead to arms
entering into the hands of those who may seek to use them in a manner that conflicts with
the interests or wider concerns of the exporting state.
International law lays down a number of express prohibitions on transfers of arms. These can
take the form of arms embargoes and trade sanctions (see below) imposed by the UN Security
Council or some other international body banning the export of some or all categories of arms
to particular end-users. Beyond this, international law also expressly prohibits transfers of certain
specific weapons such as anti-personnel mines, blinding laser weapons and the mines,
booby traps and other devices addressed in Protocol II (as amended) to the 1980 Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).6
Furthermore, international law also curtails states’ freedom to authorise transfers in situations
where the use made of the weapons by the recipient would be unlawful. Whilst states bear
primary responsibility for breaches of international law that they, themselves, commit, there
are also circumstances where a state may bear “secondary” or indirect responsibility for
violations committed by other states.7 The International Law Commission has identified the
transfer of arms as a case in point and has stated that for this indirect responsibility to arise,
the state transferring the arms does not need to intend to support the recipient in the illicit use
of the arms.8 Rather, the exporting state need only be aware of the relevant circumstances
i.e. that the arms may be used for the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the
recipient state or an actor under its direct control.
On the basis of this principle, states should not transfer arms which they know could be used
to violate the following rules:
The prohibition on the threat or use of force:9
Whilst the right of self-defence is often invoked by governments, this right is subject to limitations
that flow from the prohibition on the threat or use of force. Accordingly, if it appears likely that
a recipient of arms will use them to violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force, then
the arms transfer should be considered illicit under international law.
Non-intervention in internal affairs of other states:
If a state exports arms without ensuring that the transfer complies with the laws of the recipient
state and without the state’s authorisation, the supply could constitute unlawful interference
in the recipient state’s internal affairs.10 Accusations of unlawful interference are all the more
likely if the weapons are supplied to opposition forces within the recipient state, whilst the
prohibition also applies if the weapons are used by the recipient state to intervene in the
affairs of a third state.
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International humanitarian law:
International humanitarian law prohibits the use of weapons intrinsically incapable of
distinguishing between combatants and civilians or which are of a nature to cause serious
injury or unnecessary suffering. 11 Some of these weapons have been the subject of specific
conventions, the most recent of which have prohibited not only the use of the weapons but
also their transfers (see above). With regard to those weapons which are incapable of
distinguishing between combatants and civilians or which are of a nature to cause serious injury
or unnecessary suffering, but which are not the subject of a specific convention, a prohibition
on transfers can be inferred from the obligation in common Article 1 of the Geneva Convention
“to respect and ensure respect” for international humanitarian law.
Indeed this commitment has wider implications for the transfer of all arms, to the end that states
would be in violation of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions if they transferred
arms that are likely to be used to commit violations of international humanitarian law.12
Human rights law and standards:
Following on from the prohibitions enshrined by the Geneva Conventions, it is also the case
that states cannot legally transfer arms that are likely to be used for serious violations of
international human rights standards, as set out in the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights and numerous other regional instruments.1 3 In addition, the duty of states 
to protect the right to life could also be interpreted as meaning that it is illegal for states to supply
arms to private actors in another country when the actors are operating outside the control 
of the host country and committing violent crimes.
The prohibition on genocide:
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, prohibits
and criminalizes acts of genocide as well as conspiracy to commit genocide and complicity 
in genocide. Accordingly, provided it has the necessary intent to destroy a group in whole or
in part, a state that provides weapons to another state or actor that uses them to commit
genocide will be guilty of genocide. Even when the state transferring the weapons does not
itself have the necessary intent of committing acts of genocide, if it is apparent that the weapons
will be used for these ends, the transfer will be considered illicit.
Prevention of terrorism:
On a number of occasions the General Assembly has asserted states’ duty to refrain from
giving assistance, whether direct or indirect, to terrorist groups.1 4 Furthermore, the 1988 version
of the International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind stated that “fomenting subversive terrorist activities by organising, assisting or
financing such activities or by supplying arms for the purpose of such activities (emphasis
added), thereby [seriously] undermined the free exercise by that state of its sovereign rights”
thus representing a crime against the peace. Accordingly, transferring arms that may be used
in the commission of acts of terrorism is considered illicit under international law.
Prohibitions
under
international
law
Beyond the restrictions that are laid down in international law, there are a number of other
factors that governments, to a greater or lesser extent, take into account when deciding
whether or not to grant or refuse an export licence for SALW. The extent to which such
concerns do, in fact, have a material impact on the decision to licence exports of SALW
varies, depending on the particular perspective of the exporting government and on the
nature and situation of the recipient. There is, however, increasing recognition of the need 
to take into account concerns such as the following:
The threat of use of SALW in conflict:
Beyond the need to observe the prohibition on the use of force as set out in the UN Charter
(see above), the potential use of arms in a conflict situation is also an important consideration.
A number of governments, including Italy and Belgium, are prohibited, by their domestic
legislation, from transferring arms which could be used in a conflict situation, regardless of
whether the recipient is the aggressor or the subject of aggression.
The potential effect on international/regional stability:
Some governments take into account the potential impact of arms transfers on regional and
international stability. Certain regions of the world can be prone to conflict at a particular time
and the unregulated transfer of arms can exacerbate tensions or upset a delicate balance of
p o w e r. The destabilising accumulation of conventional arms in the Middle East region is widely
regarded as having been a contributing factor to the 1991 Gulf Wa r. The flurry of initiatives that
emerged in the aftermath of this conflict – including the UN Register of Conventional Arms 
– demonstrated a desire on the part of the international community to learn lessons from 
this period.
The undermining of economic development:
Governments are becoming increasingly aware of the potential for expenditure on arms in
recipient states to contribute to the diversion of resources from social development projects.
Whilst SALW have a comparatively low unit cost, large shipments could have the effect 
of undermining development in a recipient country, particularly when part of a large-scale
procurement exercise. The lack of transparency in many countries’arms export and procurement
programmes, however, makes it difficult to identify situations when the acquisition of SALW
is part of such a concerted military build-up.
The risk of diversion or transhipment to an illicit end-user:
Beyond the possibility of arms being used for illicit purposes by the intended recipient, as set
out above, arms exporting states also assess the risk of the diversion or transhipment of the
arms to an unauthorised entity. In making their assessment, states need to take into account
factors such as the international good standing of the recipient and its record in complying
with international treaties, with international and regional arrangements, and with UN sanctions
and resolutions.
The main problem with seeking to elaborate on principles for the purposes of controlling
arms exports is that, whilst states may agree on what their main concerns are, it is nevertheless
d i fficult to agree what the application of the criteria means for arms transfers in the quantitative
and qualitative sense. Some of the above concerns may lead one government to institute 
a unilateral embargo on the transfer of SALW to a recipient, whilst other states may take 
a different view.
Background to Controls on Government-Authorised
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If states actively develop and implement effective legislation and mechanisms for implementing
UN arms embargoes, such action will go a considerable way to preventing the proliferation
and misuse of SALW. However, to be effective, UN arms embargoes also need to be grounded
in a framework of national, regional and internationally agreed export criteria that provide for
strict control and limitation of arms transfers that might be diverted to embargoed destinations.
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council has the power to adopt binding
resolutions imposing sanctions and embargoes when it considers there to be “a threat or
breach of the peace or act of aggression”.15 Many UN arms embargoes have been imposed
in response to violations of international law by a state or non-state actor. All United Nations
Member States – and arguably all states – are required to adhere to these resolutions by
refraining from transferring arms to the embargoed entity; they are also required to take steps
to enforce the embargo against individuals within their jurisdiction. In a resolution of 1998,
the Security Council called upon states to adopt legislation making the violation of arms
embargoes a criminal offence.
As well as legally binding embargoes the UN can also adopt embargoes which are non-
mandatory in nature. In the last decade the UN Security Council has imposed 14 arms
embargoes, either mandatory or non-mandatory (see Annex 1). In certain cases these
embargoes have extended to neighbouring states and, in recent examples, to non-state
actors such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) in Sierra Leone.
In practice, however, the enforcement of arms embargoes has proven problematic and states
and private actors have violated them with impunity.
Between April and July 1994 genocide was committed in Rwanda during which up to one million men,
women and children were murdered. In May 1994, in response to the gross human rights violations
being committed, a UN arms embargo was imposed against the genocidaires by Security Council
Resolution 918. However despite this UN embargo, arms continued to reach those committing
genocide.
In September 1995 the UN Security Council established an International Commission of Inquiry
(UNICOI) on Rwanda. Its primary mandate was to “collect information on the sale or supply of
arms and related materiel to former Rwandan government forces” in violation of the May 1994
UN arms embargo on weapons deliveries to the exiled Rwandan armed forces and militia.
The Commission’s investigations and reports confirmed the continuation of illegal flows of weaponry
and ammunition to the exiled former Rwandan government forces, often from or through South
Africa, Angola, Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia and Kinshasa. It was discovered that
these forces had received brand-new weapons, including Kalashnikov rifles and anti-personnel
landmines, which were not available to them before the imposition of the UN embargo.
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Overview of Existing Controls: UN and Regional Embargoes,
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Regional Arms Embargoes
Anumber of regional organisations, including the EU, OSCE, the Commonwealth and a grouping
of eight African states,17 have also developed a mechanism whereby they can agree on the
imposition of arms embargoes. These regional embargoes are, on the whole, well observed
and, in the absence of a UN agreement, can be an important demonstration of political will
on the part of a group of states. Moreover, they can act as important building blocks for wider
international action. However, whilst such embargoes send an important message to the
international community, their effectiveness can be limited for two important reasons. Firstly
these agreements are often politically rather than legally binding and there is little recourse
should a Member State decide to ignore the terms of an embargo. Secondly they are, by
their very nature, regional in scope and can be thus undermined by countries outside the
arrangement who may not subscribe to the same political view.
ECOWAS Moratorium
To date the only agreement banning transfers specifically of SALW is the moratorium concluded
on 31 October 1998 by the members of the Economic Community of West African States
( E C O WAS). This non-binding Moratorium prohibits the “importation, exportation and manufacture
of light weapons in ECOWAS Member States” for a renewable period of three years.
The establishment of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and
Development (PCASED) in March 1999, was an important step toward implementing the
Moratorium. This programme, supported financially by external donor states, is intended 
to operationalise and reinforce the Moratorium by building internal capacity among states
(including within the police and judiciary) to sustain efforts against arms trafficking. It promotes
arms collection efforts, the development of legal and regulatory measures relating to weapons
possession and transfer, and the establishment of a regional arms register.18
A number of states outside the region have publicly stated their adherence to the Moratorium.
The Wassenaar Arrangement, the EU and the OSCE have stated such respect and adherence
to the Moratorium, and Member States have largely refrained from authorising SALW transfers
to the ECOWAS region. However, regardless of such pledges, concerns have been expressed
about the Moratorium’s effectiveness, for example, in the report of December 2000 by the
UN Panel of Experts on Diamonds and Arms in Sierra Leone.19
During the 1990s, the Security Council has begun to develop mechanisms to follow up and
oversee embargo monitoring and implementation. In addition to the resolution of 1998, in which
the Security Council called upon states to adopt legislation making the violation of arms
embargoes a criminal offence, in September 1999, following a Ministerial meeting of the
Security Council to consider the issue of SALW, a Presidential Statement was issued calling
for implementation of Security Council arms embargoes. In April 2000, the Panel of Experts
appointed to investigate alleged violations of the sanctions imposed against UNITA in A n g o l a ,
also made an extensive set of recommendations for effective embargo enforcement, many 
of which should be applied to all UN embargoes.20
Whilst the speedy enactment and stringent enforcement of UN and regional arms embargoes
are a crucial part of efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in SALW they remain, at best,
a partial solution. Whilst UN embargoes may be useful tools for limiting the influx of weapons
into an area of conflict or to a human rights crisis zone, they are of limited use in preventing
the build-up of arms in the first instance as they are often imposed only after the Security
Council has determined that a threat or breach of the peace exists which may only be recognised
after a military build-up has occurred. In addition, lack of political will within the Security Council
or other relevant bodies has frequently prevented or delayed the imposition of such sanctions
despite a clear need for such action.
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Ultimately controls on SALW are operationalised at the national level. Such national controls
often incorporate a licensing determination system, which requires export licence applications
to be judged against an objective set of criteria. The criteria used by states for such licence
determinations typically include security considerations, the danger of illegal trafficking or of
the arms being used by terrorists organisations or against the exporting state itself. However
a growing number of exporting states such as South Africa, Germany and the United Kingdom,
have also included development concerns or human rights and humanitarian law considerations
in their export licensing systems.
Whilst the development and stringent enforcement of comprehensive national arms export
controls are a vital element to ensuring SALW are not transferred to human rights violators 
or other illicit end-users, such measures are not in themselves sufficient when implemented
by a minority of states. The positive initiatives of certain states to halt the flow of SALW to
illicit end-users have in the past been undermined by the actions of other states who have
less stringent controls and which have been willing to “undercut” more responsible exporting
states. Initiatives to develop sub-regional, regional and international controls on the legal
trade in SALW are key to ensuring effective prevention and combating of the illicit trade.
Although regional small arms transfer limitation agreements are a relatively recent concept,
they are gaining in currency. The following sets out examples of two types of initiatives that
have been undertaken in the last decade.
OSCE Criteria
In November 1993 the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
now the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), adopted a document
entitled “Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers”. This required states, when
considering proposed transfers to take into account a number of factors concerning recipient
states, including their humans rights record; their record of compliance with international
commitments; the internal and regional situation; and the nature and cost of the arms in question
in relation to the circumstances of the recipient states. The criteria provided that states “will avoid
transfers which would be likely to”, among other things, be used for “the violation or suppression
of human rights and fundamental freedoms”; “threaten the national security of other states”;
contravene UN sanctions or arms control, disarmament or non-proliferation agreements;
prolong or aggravate existing conflicts or support or encourage terrorism.22
In July 1997 the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary announced new UK Government guidelines
to be used in considering conventional arms export licence applications.21 A principal concern
related to the possible use of UK arms exports for “internal repression”. Under these guidelines:
“An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need 
to comply with the UK’s international obligations and commitments, or by concern that the goods
might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or by the risks to regional stability,
or by other considerations as described in these criteria.”
More specifically, the guidelines state that “The Government will not issue an export licence if
there is a clearly identifiable risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression”.
In elaborating on what will constitute grounds for refusing a licence, the guidelines make the case
for refusal where “there is clear evidence of the recent use of similar equipment for internal repression
by the proposed end-user... or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted
from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression.”
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This document is an important advance in regional efforts to address legal arms transfers.
Firstly, the range of countries covered by the criteria is large – the then CSCE covered the
continent of Europe including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and former
Warsaw Pact states together with the United States (US) and Canada and hence included
many of the world’s leading arms exporters. Secondly, the range of concerns covered by the
criteria are relatively comprehensive, addressing all the major principles that governments
should adhere to in the regulation of arms transfers. The main drawback of the OSCE principles
is that a number of criteria lack detail and so are open to varying interpretations. Beyond this,
the nature of the OSCE as an institution has meant that the criteria are politically rather than
legally binding. The absence of an agreement for ensuring consistent application of the
principles by OSCE states has left their implementation by many members in doubt.
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers
The Code of Conduct for Arms Exports was agreed by Foreign Ministers in May 1998 and
adopted by the Council of the European Union in June 1998. It is an important initiative in that
it represents a first major step towards the development of a common, responsible approach
to arms exports by EU Member States. The Code covers exports of military equipment and
dual-use goods.2 3 The EU Code has subsequently been adopted by the EU Associated States
of Eastern and Central Europe with which the European Union has concluded association
agreements, Cyprus, the EFTAcountries, members of the European Economic Area and Canada.
It is also referred to in the EU-US and EU-Canada Small Arms Declarations of December 1999.
In November 2000, the second Consolidated Report of the EU Code recorded that Malta and
Turkey have pledged to subscribe to the principles of the Code.
The Code of Conduct requires EU Member States to consider requests for exports of military
equipment (including SALW) on a case-by-case basis, assessing their compatibility with eight
criteria covering the following issues: respect for international commitments; respect for human
rights; the internal situation of the recipient state; preservation of regional stability; the international
security of Member States; the recipient state’s attitude towards terrorism; the risk of diversion;
and promotion of development.
The European Union Code also contains operative provisions aimed at harmonising its
application by Member States, increasing the transparency, enabling consultation and
preventing undercutting. Under these provisions, states are required to notify each other of
export licences they have refused for failure to meet the criteria. Before any Member State
can grant a licence which has been denied by another Member State for an essentially
identical transaction in the preceding three years, it is required to consult the state that
denied the licence. Although the power to take the final decision remains with individual
states, if a licence is granted in these circumstances, the licensing state will have to provide 
a detailed explanation of its reasoning. The Code of Conduct also imposes an annual
reporting obligation on states.
With its comprehensive determination, criteria coupled with the operative provisions, the EU
Code represents an important advance in regional control. However, the Code does have a
number of important weaknesses. Firstly the EU Code is a politically binding agreement only.
Furthermore a number of the criteria, such as those relating to internal and regional instability,
are not sufficiently explicit, leaving too much scope for individual interpretation by Member
states. A further weakness is that Code fails to include violations of international humanitarian
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law in the receiving state as a ground for refusing the transfer – under the Code such
violations are merely elements that the exporting state should “take into account”.
Additionally, the consultations on possible undercutting (when one state wishes to take up a
licence previously denied by another) are conducted on a bilateral basis, depriving the wider
group of EU states of potentially valuable information and insights into concerns relating to
arms export controls. Despite such concerns, the EU Code represents a major advance in
regional export controls and should be seen as a crucial step towards the development of
harmonised international controls.
UN Security Council P5 Guidelines
In 1991, the five permanent members of the Security Council also adopted a set guidelines
with regard to conventional arms transfers.24 These provide that the states in question would
avoid transfers likely to prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict; increase tension 
or introduce destabilising military capability in a region; contravene embargoes or other
internationally agreed restraints; be used otherwise than for legitimate defence and security
needs; support international terrorism; be used to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign
states; or seriously undermine the recipient state’s economy. The methods for implementing
the guidelines were left to the individual states. Following a breakdown of the discussions in
1992, no further progress was made in the implementation of the guidelines.
UN Disarmament Commission Guidelines
The 1996 Disarmament Commission Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context
of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 represented the first collective
articulation by UN Member states of the need for controls on the export of arms.
The Disarmament Commission guidelines acknowledge states’ right to self defence and right
to transfer means of self defence, but note that there are “serious and urgent” concerns
regarding the nature and extent of the international arms trade and the level of illicit traff i c k i n g .
Whilst the guidelines refer, to a significant degree, to the illicit trafficking in arms they do state
that “Arms transfers should be addressed in conjunction with maintaining international peace
and security, reducing regional and international tensions, preventing and resolving conflicts
and disputes, building and enhancing confidence and promoting disarmament as well as social
and economic development.” The guidelines then go on to say that “Restraint and greater
openness, including various transparency measures, can help in this respect and contribute
to the promotion of international peace and security” and that states should “recognise the
need for transparency in arms transfers”. States are also required to exercise “restraint over
the production and procurement of arms as well as transfers” whilst beyond economic or
commercial considerations states are requested to consider inter alia “efforts aimed at easing
international tensions,... peacefully resolving regional conflicts, preventing arms races and
achieving disarmament...”. Exporters and importers of arms alike are required to ensure that
their activities in these respects do not contribute to instability and conflict or to illicit traff i c k i n g .
Although far from exhaustive, the Disarmament Commission guidelines could be viewed as
the beginnings of an international consensus. Whilst the concerns to which they allude place
an emphasis on avoiding contributing to conflict and illicit trafficking, the references to the role
of transparency in encouraging restraint and the potential adverse affect of arms transfers on
economic development are positive indicators. However, they are lacking in a number of respects
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and fail to include several concerns that are afforded high priority by many states, such as the
need to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the need to respect and ensure
respect for international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, as baseline principles, the Disarmament
Commission guidelines represent a starting point for the international community.
When examining the relevance of the Disarmament Commission guidelines to the UN 2001
Conference, perhaps the most important statement is the assertion that “Illicit arms trafficking
is understood to cover that international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the
laws of states and/or international law.” The assertion that transfers of arms, including SALW,
which conflict with international law are, in fact, illicit raises an interesting prospect – namely,
that it is within the scope of the UN Conference to examine and seek to codify the application
of international law in the field of SALW transfers.
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The development of regional declarations has gathered pace as governments, sub-regional
and regional organisations have developed initiatives to bring to the 2001 Conference. Whilst
such initiatives have divergences, reflecting their own regional priorities, resources, and
established control structures, there are many areas of commonality. The development of
regionally accepted norms and standards on legal transfers should pave the way towards the
articulation of internationally agreed norms and standards at the UN Conference. The
following initiatives give an indication of the breadth of activity that is forming around the
Conference process.
An important initiative in the development of harmonised regional controls has been the recent
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light We a p o n s2 5 which was adopted at the 308th Plenary
meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in November 2000. Throughout this
document, there is a clear acknowledgement that legal export controls are crucial elements
in combating the illicit SALW trade. Since the OSCE now includes 55 countries, including
many of the leading SALW manufacturers and exporters, this is an important development.
Among a number of detailed measures outlined in the document, Member States have
agreed to:
l exchange information on exports and imports of SALW within the OSCE region;
l combat illicit trafficking of SALW by prosecuting illegal manufacture, marking SALW and
destroying or marking any unmarked weapons; and
l control the legal trade by adopting:
(i) commonly agreed standards, building on the 1993 OSCE criteria, for licensing SALW
exports; and 
(ii) common OSCE wide standards for documentation for import, export and transit of
SALW.
During a Ministerial Conference from 30 November - 1 December 2000, the Organisation of
African Unity adopted the Bamako Declaration on an African common position on the illicit
proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW.26 This Declaration presented a multilateral
plan of action for both exporting and recipient countries.
At the national level the Declaration called on exporting states to:
“take appropriate measures to control arms transfers by manufacturers, suppliers, traders,
brokers, as well as shipping and transit agents, in a transparent fashion.”
This demand was reinforced by a call at the regional level to:
“encourage the codification and harmonisation of legislation governing the manufacture,
trading, brokering, possession and use of small arms and ammunition.” 
Furthermore the OAU appealed to the international community and particularly, “arms
supplier countries” to:
“iv) enact appropriate legislation and regulations to control arms transfers by manufacturers,
suppliers, traders, brokers, shipping and transit agents” and
“v) enact stringent laws, regulations and administrative procedures to ensure the effective
control over the transfer of small arms and light weapons, including mechanisms with a view
to facilitating the identification of illicit arms transfers”.
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The recognition of the need to strenuously control the legal trade in SALW in order to eff e c t i v e l y
combat the illicit trade is also addressed throughout the recently agreed EU Plan of Action 
to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects.27
The EU Plan of Action also recognises that action to combat illicit trafficking cannot be restricted
to national controls. At sub-regional, regional and international levels, the participating states
undertake to:
l adopt and implement regional or sub-regional moratoria on the transfer and manufacture
of SALW, and to respect such moratoria and co-operate with the countries concerned 
in the implementation thereof, including through technical assistance;
l consider additional regional or sub-regional instruments or codes of conduct to improve
control over and restraint in the legal transfer of SALW, as well as to combat illicit
trafficking; and
l control the production, transfer, acquisition and holdings of SALW in accordance with states’
legitimate defence and internal security interests, in connection with surplus weapons.
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The foregoing declarations issued by regional and sub-regional groupings in advance of the
UN Conference show, in clear terms, that the need to control, eff e c t i v e l y, the legal trade in SALW
is a major concern for many states. The assertion of the inextricable link between the illicit
and legal trade in SALW has been made by the OAU, the OSCE and the EU. The elaboration
of what legal controls should constitute, however, does vary across these documents. A m a j o r
challenge for the UN Conference, therefore is to agree upon and articulate a set of clear,
comprehensive and detailed norms and standards relating to the legal trade in SALW.
Significant progress has, nevertheless, already been made. The Preparatory Committee
Draft Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects28 of January 2001 articulated a range of measures that
are necessary at the national, regional and global level in order to prevent and reduce “the
diversion of the legal manufacture and transfer [of SALW] to illicit channels” and with a view
to fostering “responsible behaviour with regard to the transfer of SALW and thereby reduc[ing]
the opportunities to engage in the illicit trade in SALW”. The measures stipulated can be
summarised as follows:
National:
l Laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export,
import, transit or retransfer of SALW;
l Applications for export authorisations of SALW to be assessed according to strict 
national criteria;
l The use of authenticated end-user certificates, and enhanced legal and enforcement
measures to safeguard against unauthorised re-transfer of SALW;
l Holdings of SALW to be limited to levels consistent with legitimate self-defence and
security interests including the ability to participate in UN peacekeeping operations;
l The establishment of rules, regulations and procedures for national collection of information
on production, stocks and transfers of SALW;
l The supply of arms only to governments, either directly or through entities authorised 
to procure arms on behalf of governments;
l The control over and criminalisation of illicit arms brokering activities; and
l The prohibition on the transfer of SALW to arms brokers as end-users.
Regional:
l Harmonisation of measures, procedures and documents for monitoring and controlling
the export, import, transit or retransfer of SALW; and
l Development of regional information exchange on arms brokers engaged in illicit activities.
Global:
l Establishment of export criteria applicable to all states;
l Development of a common understanding of the role and definition of arms broker;
l Collection and publishing of “best practice” for national legislation and procedures for the
control of arms brokers; and
l A legally binding agreement on arms brokers.
These principles and measures represent minimum standards, but they nevertheless provide
a solid foundation for the establishment of effective international controls on the legal trade 
in SALW in order to prevent the illicit trade and misuse of these weapons.
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Accordingly, the removal from the Second Draft Programme of Action (February 2001) of the
need to establish “export criteria applicable to all states” should be considered a retrograde
step. The Third Preparatory Committee and UN Conference should reinstate this important
commitment and should seek to build upon the above principles and measures through the
articulation of a comprehensive and detailed set of norms and standards governing the
international trade in SALW.
Based on the foregoing discussion of international principles governing the legal trade in SALW
and current government practice in this area, these norms and standards can be divided into
two categories: i) those principles which are based in existing international law; and ii) those
which are increasingly recognised as important factors in the international regulation of the
trade in SALW.29
Those norms or principles that are based in international law include the following:
l The need to ensure adherence to UN embargoes and other limitations placed upon the
transfer of SALW by the UN Security Council;
l The need to respect international treaties prohibiting the transfer of specific types of SALW;
l The prohibition on transfers of arms which are banned by international humanitarian law
because they are incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or because
they may cause excessive injury or suffering;
l The prohibition on transfers of SALW which would be used by the recipient to violate the
prohibition on the use of force or to interfere in the internal affairs of another state (as set
out in the UN Charter);
l The prohibition on transfers of SALW that would be used to commit serious violations 
of human rights;
l The prohibition on transfers of SALW that would be used to commit serious violations 
of international humanitarian law;
l The prohibition on transfers of SALW that would be used in the commission of acts of
genocide or crimes against humanity;
l The prohibition on transfers of SALW that would be used to commit acts of terrorism;
l The necessity of ensuring that transfers of SALW are not diverted for any of the above
purposes.
Those areas of emerging international consensus include the need to avoid transfers of arms
that would:
l Undermine the social and economic development of the recipient state;
l Lead to the destabilising accumulation of weapons in a region or contribute to existing
regional instability;
l Contribute to internal instability in the recipient state; and
l Be used for the violent suppression of democratic rights.
In addition, states should consider the necessity of ensuring that transfers of SALW are not
diverted for any of the above purposes.
The UN Conference should elaborate on each of these principles with the view to arriving at
a common understanding amongst all states regarding what each of these principles means
for the transfer of SALW. Priority areas for in-depth consideration should include: enforcement
of embargoes; observance of international human rights standards and international humanitarian
law; regional destabilisation as a result of the excessive accumulation of SALW; and risk of
diversion to unauthorised end-users.
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In addition, the UN Conference should agree upon a comprehensive set of legal, administrative
and practical measures to ensure that the elaborated norms and standards are enforced
rigorously by all states. A number of such measures are set out in the Draft Programme of
Action of January 2001. Minimum standards should, however, include:
l An agreement on effective measures for certifying and monitoring the end-use of SALW
post-export with a view to preventing the diversion or misuse of legal SALW transfers;
l Provisions for regular information exchange between all states on SALW transfers;
l Provisions for regular public reporting by each state on transfers of SALW;
l Model regulations governing SALW import, export and in-transit licensing and certification;
l An international agreement on the registration of arms brokering agents and on licensing
of their activities in accordance with elaborated norms and standards (as set out above).
In order to ensure consistent application and progressive development of the above norms and
standards and of the associated legal, administrative and practical measures, the UN Conference
should also agree provisions for follow-up in these areas. An “ad hoc mechanism” such as
that referred to in the Draft Programme of Action (or other appropriate international body)
should be charged with conducting an annual review of the application of the norms and
standards based on the provision of comprehensive information on transfers of SALW on the
part of all states. Beyond this, the progressive development of the elaborated international
norms and standards should be included in a formal review of the implementation of the 
UN Conference Programme of Action which should take place by 2004 and no later than
2005. This review Conference should moreover explore the development of a legally binding
international agreement on the regulation of SALW transfers.
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Conclusion
Despite the development of national and regional arrangements which elaborate on the necessity
for controlling legal transfers of SALW, the illicit trade and misuse of these weapons has
continued. The absence of an explicit agreement at international level on a comprehensive
set of norms governing the legal trade in SALW is a significant obstacle to the promotion of
global restraint and responsibility in this area. Many governments still trade on the assumption
that “if we don’t sell, someone else will”. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small A r m s
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects provides a crucial opportunity for addressing this
damaging preconception. Only through the establishment of a detailed and comprehensive
set of internationally agreed norms and standards governing the legal trade in SALW will
effective progress in tackling the illicit trade in SALW be achieved.
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Target Entry into force Lifted Legal basis Organisation
Mandatory UNembargoes
Angola (UNITA) 15 Sept. 1993 – UNSCR 864 UN
Iraq 6 Aug. 1990 – UNSCR 661 UN
Liberiaa 19 Nov. 1992 – UNSCR 788 UN
Libya 31 Mar. 1992 5 Apr. 1999 UNSCR 748 UN
Rwanda 17 May 1994 16 Aug. 1995b UNSCR918 UN
Rwanda (rebels)c 16 Aug. 1998 – UNSCR1011 UN
Sierra Leone 8 Oct. 1997 5 June 1998 UNSCR 1132 UN
Sierra Leone (rebels)d 5 June 1998 – UNSCR 1171 UN
Somalia 23 Jan. 1992 – UNSCR 733 UN
Yugoslavia 25 Sept. 1991 1 Oct. 1996 UNSCR713 UN
Yugoslavia (FRY) 31 Mar. 1998 – UNSCR 1160 UN
Non-mandatory UNembargoes
Afghanistan 22 Oct. 1996 – UNSCR1076 UN
Eritrea 12 Feb. 1999 – UNSCR 1227 UN
Ethiopia 12 Feb. 1999 – UNSCR UN
EU embargoes (non-mandatory)
Afghanistane 17 Dec. 1996 – 96/746/CFSP EU
Bosnia and Herzegovina f 5 July 1991 – – EU
China 27 June 1989 – – EU
Croatiaf 5 July 1991 – – EU
DRCe 7 April 1993 – – EU
Ethiopiaef 15 Mar. 1999 – – EU
Eritreaef 15 Mar. 1999 – – EU
Indonesiaf 17 Sept. 1999 17 Jan. 2000 – EU
Iraq 4 Aug. 1990 – – EU
Libya 27 Jan. 1986 – – EU
Macedoniag 5 July 1991 26 Feb. 1996 – EU
Myanmar (Burma)e 29 July 1991h – – EU
Nigeriae 20 Nov. 1995 1 June 1999 95/515/CFSP EU
Sierra Leonef 8 Dec. 1997 – 98/409/CFSP EU
Sloveniag 5 July 1991 26 Feb. 1996 l – EU
Sudane 15 Mar. 1994 – 94/165/CFSP EU
Yugoslaviag 5 July 1991 – – EU
Other international embargoes (non-mandatory)
Azerbaijank 28 Feb. 1992 – – OSCE
Burundi 6 Aug. 1996 23 Jan. 1999 – 8 African
Countriesk
Nigeria 24 Apr. 1996 Nov. 1999 – Commonwealth
1 Information extracted from SIPRI
Yearbook 2000, Armaments,
Disarmament and International
Security, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute.
a Does not apply to deliveries to
ECOMOG forces in Liberia.
b The arms embargo was suspended
on this date and formally ended on 
1 Sept. 1996.
c Does not apply to deliveries to
government forces in Rwanda.  
The embargo is also on equipment
for persons in neighbouring states 
if the equipment is for use in Rwanda.
d Does not apply to deliveries to
government or ECOMOG forces 
in Sierra Leone.
e Does not apply to deliveries under
existing contracts.
f The Central and East European
Countries associated with the EU,
the associated country Cyprus and
the EFTA countries (Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway and
Switzerland), members of the
European Economic Area, have
declared that they share the
objectives of these embargoes.
g Imposed as an embargo against the
territory of the former Yugoslavia.
h A ‘decision the sale of any military
equipment’was made by the EU
General Affairs Council on 29 July
1991. On 28 Oct. 1991.  On 28 Oct.
1996 a decision confirming the
embargo (96/635/CFSP) was made
by the EU Council of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs.
i On this date the embargo was changed
to a case by case evaluation
g o v e r n e dby the EU common criteria
on arms exports adopted in 1991. T h e
e m b a rg owas officially lifted on 10
Aug. 1998.
j Only on deliveries to forces engaged
in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh
area (these would include A z e r b a i j a n i ,
Armenian and local forces).
k DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
